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 Misconduct in a Public Office—
Should It Still Be Prosecuted?
Simon Parsons*
Abstract This article examines the common law crime of misconduct in a
public office from its ancient origins, and considers the difficulties in
defining the crime. These difficulties arise from the crime being very
widely defined as it includes non-feasance, misfeasance, frauds and de-
ceits, malfeasance and oppression. It is unclear whether these are separate
categories or if they run into one another. It is also unclear if the crime is
a conduct crime or whether material damage is required. It appears that
the DPP requires material damage before a prosecution can take place. The
article argues that as the elements of the crime are so uncertain, it should
no longer be prosecuted especially in view of the availability of alternative
statutory offences which could be charged instead of the misconduct
crime. These statutory offences have the certainty which the misconduct
crime lacks and they thus enable public officials to judge their future
conduct.
Keywords Non-feasance; Misfeasance; Fraud in office; Mal-
feasance; Oppression
The crime of misconduct in a public office has a long history as its origins
can be traced back to the 13th century.1 However, modern cases are not
inclined to look beyond R v Bembridge2 where Lord Mansfield CJ’s
judgment defined the crime as involving two principles:
. . . first, that a man accepting an office of trust concerning the public,
especially if attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for
misbehaviour in his office; this is true, by whomever and in whatever way
the officer is appointed . . . Secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud,
or imposition, in a matter concerning the public, though as between
individuals it would only be actionable, yet as between the King and the
subject it is indictable. That such should be the rule is essential to the
existence of the country.3
This definition, in particular ‘misbehaviour in his office’ indicates this
common law crime embraces a wide variety of misconduct and is not
easily defined. The essence of the crime is where a person, having a
public duty entrusted to him, wilfully neglects to carry out that duty
(non-feasance) or wilfully abusing it for some improper motive (mis-
feasance). The problem with the modern cases is that the crime has been
used to prosecute conduct that does not involve actual misconduct in a
* Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Southampton Solent University; e-mail:
Simon.Parsons@solent.ac.uk.
1 See F. Pollock and W. Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd edn, vol. 2 (1898)
520–1.
2 (1783) 3 Doug 327.
3 Ibid. at 332.
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public office, but rather conduct that is incidental to the public office.4
This article will argue that misconduct in a public office should no longer
be prosecuted as its elements are so uncertain and because, in many
cases, there are alternative crimes that can used, for example, the
offences of ‘active bribery’ and ‘passive bribery’5.
The modern cases on misconduct in a public office
In the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century there has been a
revival in the prosecution of misconduct in a public office.6 This revival
has its origins in two cases R v Llewellyn-Jones7 where a county court
registrar (now a district judge) used his public office to gain an improper
financial advantage by using monies paid into court to fund two mort-
gage loans in his favour and R v Dytham8 where a police officer (who was
about to go off duty) witnessed a violent fight outside a nightclub but did
not intervene and the victim was beaten to death. Both defendants were
convicted of misconduct in a public office, and this shows the breadth of
the crime. Llewellyn-Jones appealed on the ground that the indictment
contained no express allegation of dishonesty, but the appeal was dis-
missed on the basis that dishonesty was inherent in the offence. On the
other hand, Dytham was plainly not dishonest, but he appealed on the
ground that the indictment disclosed no offence since misconduct of an
officer of justice involved malfeasance or at least a misfeasance involving
an element of corruption and not merely non-feasance as alleged in the
indictment. His appeal was dismissed, with the Court of Appeal holding
that ‘[t]he allegation made was not of mere non-feasance but of deliber-
ate failure and wilful neglect’.9 However, today Llewellyn-Jones could
be charged with fraud by abuse of position10 and Dytham with killing by
gross negligence. An omission to act will suffice for gross negligence
manslaughter where there is a duty to act. This duty is said to arise
where the defendant has a duty of care towards the victim. Dytham
owed a duty to preserve the Queen’s Peace, so there is surely an
argument that he owed a duty of care towards the victim and his
omission to act could be regarded as a concurrent cause of the victim’s
death.
In Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003),11 the defendants were
police officers who had arrested the victim who had been injured in a
fight and had become aggressive and abusive towards the staff at a
hospital where he was receiving treatment. Following medical con-
firmation that the victim was fit enough to be detained, he was placed in
4 J. R. Spencer, ‘Policemen Behaving Badly—The Abuse of Misconduct in Office’
(2010) 69 Camb LJ 423, case and comment on R v W [2010] EWCA Crim 372,
[2010] 1 WLR 310, see below.
5 Bribery Act 2010, ss 1 and 2.
6 D. Lusty, ‘Misconduct in Public Office’ (2009) 173 Criminal Law & Justice Weekly 437.
7 [1968] 1 QB 429, CA. 
8 [1979] 2 QB 722, CA.
9 Ibid. at 727.
10 Fraud Act 2006, s. 4.
11 [2004] EWCA Crim 868, [2005] QB 73.
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a semi-face-down position wearing handcuffs in the police station cus-
tody suite, but then developed breathing difficulties and died. The
officers were charged with gross negligence manslaughter and miscon-
duct in a public office. The latter charges alleged that each defendant
‘misconducted himself whilst serving as a police officer, by wilfully
failing to take reasonable and proper care of [A], an arrested person in
police custody’.12 The defendants were acquitted on the judge’s direction
because (i) in respect of the manslaughter charge, there was no causa-
tion, as the evidence did not take the case beyond the de minimis
principle and (ii) there was insufficient evidence of recklessness for a
misconduct conviction.13 The Attorney-General sought the opinion of
the court on the following questions:
(1) What are the ingredients of the common law offence of misconduct in
a public office? (2) In particular is it necessary, in proceedings for an offence
of misconduct in a public office, for the prosecution to prove ‘bad faith’
and, if so, what does bad faith mean in this context?14
The court answered these questions by defining the crime of misconduct
in a public office:
The elements of the offence of misconduct in a public office are: (1) a public
officer acting as such . . .; (2) wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or
wilfully misconducts himself . . .; (3) to such a degree as to amount to an
abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder . . .; (4) without reasonable
excuse or justification . . .
. . . we do not favour the introduction of the expression ‘bad faith’
routinely into the summing up to the jury . . . In a case such as the present,
for example, the introduction of the doctrine of bad faith, more appropriate
to a consideration of commercial dealings, might confuse the jury and
deflect them from their task of deciding whether the office of constable had
been abused by the conduct of the constables. There may, however, be
cases in which the concept of bad faith may be relevant to an assessment of
the standard of the defendant’s conduct.15
A number of points can be made about this definition. First, it is clear
that the offence of misconduct in a public office is a crime defined by
conduct as opposed to results, so that any harmful result only informs
the necessary degree of seriousness, which is a question for the jury. This
is in contrast to the tort counterpart of this offence, i.e. misfeasance in
public office, which requires both conduct and material damage.16 That
said, the misconduct offence was subject to great publicity in 2008 when
12 Above n. 11 at [1].
13 The doctor who said the victim was fit to be detained should have been charged
with manslaughter as that confirmation was made without the victim being
X-rayed or treated fully for his injuries, which included a punch in the face and a
head injury caused by falling over as a result of the punch.
14 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868, [2005] QB 73 at
[2].
15 Ibid. at [61] and [63].
16 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2001] UKHL 16. Misfeasance in public
office is the common law’s only public law tort because it can only be committed by
public officials. See M. I. Aronson ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar
Tort’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review.
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Christopher Galley a Home Office civil servant, was arrested on suspi-
cion of misconduct in a public office, the allegation being that he had
passed confidential and restricted documents to Damian Green, a Tory
MP. Mr Green was also arrested on suspicion that he had conspired to
commit, and was an accomplice to, the alleged misconduct offence. The
DPP, Keir Starmer, decided not to prosecute Galley and Green because,
whilst there was damage to the Home Office’s arrangements for hand-
ling such documents, there needed to be additional damage such as a
threat to national security and without that damage there was no
realistic prospect of conviction.17 This indicates that the CPS does require
material damage before a prosecution for the crime of misconduct in a
public office can be commenced, which means de facto the crime and the
tort are treated in a similar way.
Secondly, the offence can only be committed by a public officer, that
is to say ‘an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which
the public are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out of a fund
provided by the public’.18 This covers those who hold a public office,
such as police officers, but does it cover employees in private employ-
ment who carry out public functions such as those concerned with
security at courts and the transport of defendants?19
Thirdly, the misconduct crime is committed where the public officer
wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts him-
self. Thus, non-feasance and misfeasance are included in the misconduct
crime, but also, for the purposes of wilful neglect or misconduct, it is
necessary that the defendant has a subjective awareness of the duty to
act or a subjective recklessness as to the existence of the duty.20 In
addition, the recklessness test will apply to the question whether in
particular circumstances a duty arises at all, as well as to the conduct of
the defendant if it does.21 This is all rather vague and unclear and makes
the crime very uncertain for public officials, although in respect of
misfeasance the court does endorse the meaning of ‘wilful misconduct’
given by Webster J in Graham v Teesdale,22 namely ‘deliberately doing
something which is wrong knowing it to be wrong or with reckless
indifference as to whether it is wrong or not’.23 That does show that
subjective mens rea is required for misfeasance and the same must be
true for non-feasance because the defendant must ‘have subjective
17 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘CPS Advises Metropolitan Police No Prosecution of
Damian Green or Christopher Galley’, Press Release, 16 April 2009, available at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/122_09/, accessed 24 February 2012. See also
D. Lusty, ‘Misconduct in Public Office’ (2009) 173 JPN 437.
18 R v Whitaker [1914] 3 KB 1283 at 1296.
19 Except for bribing a foreign public official this public/private sector division can be
put aside when prosecuting for active bribery or passive bribery under ss 1 and 2 of
the Bribery Act 2010. See G. R. Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010(1) An Overview’
[2011] Crim LR 87.
20 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868, [2005] QB 73 at
[30].
21 Ibid.
22 (1981) 81 LGR 117.
23 Ibid. at 123.
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awareness of the duty to act or a subjective recklessness as to the
existence of the duty’.24
Fourthly, the non-feasance or misfeasance must be of such a degree as
to as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder. The
consequences and circumstances of his conduct have to be considered
when deciding whether that conduct fell so below the standard of
conduct expected so as to constitute the offence.25
. . . there must be a serious departure from proper standards before the
criminal offence is committed; and a departure not merely negligent but
amounting to an affront to the standing of the public office held. The
threshold is a high one requiring conduct so far below acceptable standards
as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder. A mistake,
even a serious one, will not suffice. The motive with which a public officer
acts may be relevant to the decision whether the public’s trust is abused by
the conduct. As Abbott CJ illustrated in R v Borron, a failure to insist upon
a high threshold, a failure to confine the test of misconduct as now
proposed, would place a constraint upon the conduct of public officers in
the proper performance of their duties which would be contrary to the
public interest . . .
It will normally be necessary to consider the likely consequences of the
[misconduct] in deciding whether the conduct falls so far below the stand-
ard of conduct to be expected of the officer as to constitute the offence. The
conduct cannot be considered in a vacuum: the consequences likely to
follow from it . . . will often influence the decision as to whether the
conduct amounted to an abuse of the public's trust in the officer . . . There
will be some conduct which possesses the criminal quality even if serious
consequences are unlikely . . .26
So in respect of this element of the crime, gross negligence is required
because the threshold of criminal liability is whether the misconduct is
so far below acceptable standards as to amount to an abuse of the
public's trust in the office holder. It is also clear that any consequence ‘is
merely one of many potentially relevant factors to be considered
whether this test is satisfied’.27 This adds to the complexity of the
misconduct offence which supports the argument that it should not be
prosecuted because it is insufficiently certain for public officials to judge
their future conduct and too complex for lay juries. There are modern
less complex statutory offences that may be prosecuted instead such as
theft, fraud and bribery.
However, the opinion in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) at
least gives a more modern definition of the misconduct offence upon
which the courts of first instance could base later decisions. But, in R v
W28 the Court of Appeal further complicated the law by adding to the
definition (i) frauds and deceits (fraud in office), (ii) wilful excesses of
official authority (malfeasance), and (iii) the intentional infliction of
24 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868, [2005] QB 73 at
[30].
25 Ibid. at [58].
26 Ibid. at [56] and [58].
27 D. Lusty, ‘Misconduct in Public Office’ (2009) 173 JPN 437.
28 [2010] EWCA Crim 372, [2010] 1 WLR 310.
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bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury upon a person (oppres-
sion).29 When fraud in office is alleged (such as acquisition of property
by theft or fraud), then an essential ingredient of the misconduct offence
is evidence that the defendant was dishonest. Presumably dishonesty
equates to ‘bad faith’ referred to in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of
2003) and if dishonesty is in issue then, it is assumed, the Ghosh test of
dishonesty30 will have to be applied which makes the jury’s task even
more complicated. In respect of malfeasance (an act which is unlawful in
itself) and oppression, surely these could be charged as ‘ordinary’ crimes
such as bribery, theft, fraud and assault?
Conclusion
The facts of R v W show how the misconduct offence has spread beyond
its original purpose of punishing serious non-feasance or misfeasance.
W appealed against his conviction for misconduct in a public office. The
case against W was that while he was a serving police officer he had
wilfully misconducted himself by improperly using a police force credit
card, intended only to cover work expenses, to incur expenditure of
about £12,500 for personal use funded from public moneys. He ad-
mitted that he had used the card for personal use, but said that he did so
believing that he was entitled to use it in that way provided that he
intended to refund the cost attributable to personal expenditure; he
denied that he was guilty of deliberate misconduct or dishonesty. W’s
appeal was allowed and a retrial ordered because where the crime of
misconduct in a public office was committed in circumstances that
involved the acquisition of property by theft or fraud (fraud in office),
and in particular when the office holder was alleged to have made
improper claims for public funds in circumstances that were said to be
criminal, an essential ingredient of the offence was proof that he was
dishonest, and the directions to the jury omitted that ingredient. But the
point is that this was not a case of misconduct in a public office as W’s
misconduct did not take the form of a breach of, or failure to perform his
duties, as a police officer. W should have been charged with theft or, if
there had been a false representation, fraud.
This is recognised by Spencer, who states that the misconduct offence
‘has a tendency . . . to spread in all directions; and, unless it is kept
carefully in check, it will take over anything and everything’,31 and who
believes that this common law offence has no place in the criminal law
of the 21st century.32 The misconduct offence is regarded as a very
serious offence as it is triable only on indictment and it is punished with
a maximum of life imprisonment. The CPS charging guidance33 recog-
nises this by making it clear that the misconduct offence should only be
29 Above n. 28 at [8].
30 [1982] QB 105, CA.
31 Spencer, above n. 4.
32 Ibid.
33 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Misconduct in Public Office’, Legal Guidance, available
at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/misconduct_in_public_office/, accessed 24 February
2012.
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used for serious examples of misconduct when there is no appropriate
statutory offence that would adequately describe the nature of the
misconduct or give the court adequate sentencing powers. The guidance
then states:
Misconduct in public office should be considered where:
● there was serious misconduct or a deliberate failure to perform a duty
owed to the public, with serious potential or actual consequences for
the public;
● there is no suitable statutory offence for a piece of serious misconduct
(such as a serious breach of or neglect of a public duty that is not in
itself a criminal offence);
● the facts are so serious that the court’s sentencing powers would
otherwise be inadequate; or
● it would assist the presentation of the case as a whole (for example,
where a co-defendant has been charged with an indictable offence but
the statutory offence is summary only and cannot be committed or
sent for trial with the co-defendant).
There may be cases in which a number of statutory offences can be more
conveniently indicted as a single charge of misconduct in public office in
order to make the case easier to present to the court.34
The CPS guidance is to be welcomed as it recognises the potential of
the misconduct offence to spread beyond its original purpose. However,
the CPS continues to prosecute the misconduct offence when there
appears to be a suitable statutory offence. For example, Munir Patel, a
court clerk dealing with traffic summons, was charged with one count of
active bribery and one count of misconduct in a public offence after he
had actively sought bribes for not putting details of penalty points on a
court database and thus allowed 53 offenders to escape the proper
consequences of their offending. On 18 November 2011 Patel was
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for active bribery and six years’
imprisonment concurrent for misconduct in a public office.35 Patel could
have been charged only with bribery as the maximum punishment for
that offence, when convicted on indictment, is 10 years.36
In his commentary to R v W, Andrew Ashworth comments ‘[m]iscon-
duct in a public office is one of those common law offences that cries out
for an authoritative restatement, preferably after a thorough examina-
tion by the Law Commission’.37 A better CPS policy would be to stop
prosecuting the misconduct offence until there has been that authoritat-
ive restatement, preferably by Parliament. At present the elements of
the misconduct offence are so uncertain that an Article 7 challenge is a
definite possibility.
34 Above n. 33.
35 ‘Court clerk Munir Patel jailed for taking bribes’, BBC News, 18 November 2011,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-15689869, accessed 24
February 2012.
36 Bribery Act 2010, s. 11.
37 [2010] Crim LR 779 at 780.
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